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ABSTRACT 
 
This study focuses on the wealth–protective effects of socially responsible firm behavior by 
examining the association between corporate social performance (CSP) and financial risk for 
an extensive panel data sample of S&P 500 companies between the years 1992 and 2009. In 
addition, the link between CSP and investor utility is investigated. The main findings are that 
corporate social responsibility is negatively but weakly related to systematic firm risk and 
that corporate social irresponsibility is positively and strongly related to financial risk. The 
fact that both conventional and downside risk measures lead to the same conclusions adds 
convergent validity to the analysis. However, the risk–return trade–off appears to be such that 
no clear utility gain or loss can be realized by investing in firms characterized by different 
levels of social and environmental performance. Overall volatility conditions of the financial 
markets are shown to play a moderating role in the nature and strength of the CSP–risk 
relationship. 
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 Within the rapidly evolving research area of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), a 
significant portion of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature has concentrated on 
studying the specificities of the relationship between the corporate social performance (CSP) 
and measures of the corporate financial performance (CFP) of the firm.  For many 
researchers, managers, and investors, the question of whether there is a business case for CSR 
is of key importance.  Perceptions of a positive (or negative) direct or indirect relationship 
between a corporation’s social responsibility and its bottom line promote (or deter) the 
implementation of CSR principles in both corporate and investment strategies. The academic 
debate concerning the nature of the link between CSP and CFP is a persistent and 
controversial one. Due to a variety of definitional, measurement, and methodological issues, 
there is no consensus in the relevant literature, either at the firm or portfolio level of analysis, 
with results often in sharp conflict (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2003) – 
some studies indicate a positive CSP–CFP relationship (Hillman and Keim, 2001), others 
point to a negative link (Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2006) or to no significant association 
between the two (Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008a; Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten, 
2005). Among these studies, the common denominator is the use of measures of financial 
performance that focus on firm profitability (accounting measures) or on stock returns 
(market measures), sometimes using risk (either accounting or market risk, respectively) only 
as an adjustment factor. 
 The inherent assumption in these papers is that CSP can influence CFP solely through 
a front door mechanism. Under the stakeholder management perspective, CSP is expected to 
contribute to the creation of sustainable comparative advantages that will enhance firm 
profitability and lead to an overall positive CSP–CFP relationship (Jones, 1995). In 
contradiction to this, there are those who view CSR practices as a misappropriation and 
misallocation of valuable corporate resources which are detrimental to firm performance 
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(Friedman, 1970). The final possibility is that there are so many intervening variables 
between CSP and CFP that identifying a consistent, statically significant relationship between 
the two is prohibitively difficult (Ullmann, 1985).  
 In this study, we attempt to offer an alternative empirical pathway in relation to the 
CSP–CFP connection by investigating the possibility of the existence of a back door 
mechanism between the two so that CSP has wealth–protective instead of wealth–enhancing 
effects that are captured in the corporations’ stock market valuations. To investigate such 
effects, we will focus our analysis upon the relationship between CSP and financial risk 
(rather than profitability or returns on share ownership) at the firm level. Thus, in a 
substantive departure from previous studies of the CSP–CFP link, risk will be employed as a 
key dependent variable. 
 The relationship between CSP and financial risk carries considerable potential 
importance for managers and investors alike. Managers seeking to reduce the uncertainty to 
which their businesses fortunes are subject would find it useful to know whether improved 
CSP is likely to increase or decrease the variability of future firm performance. This is 
especially true if one accepts that the claim of Cox, Brammer, and Millington, (2004, p.29) 
that “there is a broad consensus in the conceptual literature that many financial gains from 
improved social performance accrue in the long run” also applies to the effects of CSP on 
financial risk. It may be the case that companies which have invested in environmental 
programs that utilize renewable energy and clean fuels or other firms that make great efforts 
to ensure the optimal quality and safety characteristics of their products and services might be 
better equipped to cope with adverse systematic economic shocks than their competitors who 
are not involved in such practices. Secondly, because of the alleged long-term, risk reductive 
effects of socially responsible corporate activity, the stocks of firms with high levels of CSP 
might be attractive to specific types of institutional investors such as pension funds that “tend 
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to have significantly predictable, long-term outflows to beneficiaries”  (Ryan and Schneider, 
2002, p.560). This reasoning is empirically supported by Cox et al. (2004) who find a 
positive and significant relationship between the proportion of company ownership by 
pension funds/life assurance companies and CSP. 
 Lastly, given the turmoil in financial markets during the 2000-2002 (caused by the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble) and 2008-2009 periods (real estate downturn and systemic 
crisis), with most stock indices around the globe losing a significant part of their values 
within a few months, the issue becomes even more pivotal.
1
 In times such as these, the 
stylized fact is that the average investor’s risk aversion increases and more attention is 
directed towards the avoidance of high risk rather than the reaping of great returns. The 
hypothesized wealth-protective effects of CSP would make the respective firm stocks highly 
desirable investment assets. 
 The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section I discusses the existing 
evidence in the relation between CSP and financial risk per se. Section II provides the 
theoretical framework upon which this empirical work is based. The characteristics of the 
data that are utilized and the construction of the CSP and financial risk/utility measures 
employed are introduced in Section III. Section IV contains the details of the methodological 
process that is implemented. Section V presents the results of the various analyses that have 
been performed whereas Section VI draws conclusions and makes suggestions for future 
research. 
 
                                                          
1
 Some academics have compared the latter situation with the stock market crash during the 
Great Depression (Eichengreen and O’ Rourke, 2009). 
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I. CSP and Financial Risk: The Existing Evidence 
 Empirical testing of the hypothesis of the wealth-protective consequences of corporate 
social and environmental behavior through an examination of the link between CSP and 
financial risk is a route that a relatively small number of researchers have taken.
2
 Given the 
existence of a significant number of conceptual links between CSP and financial risk, this 
observation is especially startling.  Spicer (1978) was amongst the first to conduct such a 
study. He uses the Controls for Environmental Pollution (CEP) reports as a CSP measure and 
finds negative Spearman rank order correlations between it and measures of total and 
systematic risk, thus providing some early empirical support for a risk-reducing effect of 
strong CSP. Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield, (1985) report a correlation analysis in which 
CSP constructs created from the results of a forced-choice survey of corporate Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) are used along with accounting measures of CFP (return on assets 
(ROA)) and risk (beta, Value Line’s safety index). No measure of financial performance is 
significantly related to factors like the employment of social forecasting or having a social 
responsibility committee, but all of the latter are significantly and negatively related to total 
financial risk and insignificantly negatively associated with long-term beta. Building on this 
paper, Aupperle and Pham (1989) aggregate the non-economic components of CSP and use a 
variety of accounting (ROA, return on equity (ROE), and return on stock (ROS)) and market 
(stock price growth, total return to investor) measures of CFP. They find no significant 
relationship between CSP and any measure of financial performance or even financial risk. 
                                                          
2
 From this point onwards, unless otherwise mentioned, the term “financial risk” will be used 
to mean “market risk”. 
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Somewhat similarly, McGuire, Sungren, and Schneeweis, (1988) use a sample of large US 
firms rated in Fortune’s ‘America’s Most Admired Companies’ reputation index (one 
attribute of which is environmental and social responsibility). They use multiple CFP 
measures (total return, asset growth, alpha, and others) and risk measures (operating leverage 
and beta) and run regressions for different time windows. They find that CSP is positively 
(and strongly) related to CFP and negatively (and less strongly) related to both prior and 
subsequent systematic risk.  
 Orlitzky and Benjamin’s (2001) meta-analysis summarizes the characteristics of the 
datasets, methodologies and conclusions of the previously presented research papers along 
with those of many other studies that were published between 1976 and 1997. Their summary 
of previous research is indicative of the limitations of the empirical work in this area. For 
example, they demonstrate (Table I, pp. 380-382) that the entire set of the meta-analyzed 
studies, consists of very narrow data samples, which contain between less than a dozen 
(Baldwin, Tower, Litvak, Karpen, Jackson, and McTigue, 1986) to a maximum of 469 
observations (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Furthermore, as observations are most commonly 
taken from the same year, making the respective studies cross-sectional in nature, the time 
sensitivity of the conclusions is not investigated.   
 There are also discrepancies in the CSP measures that are used (reputational ratings, 
CEP reports or rankings, mention of CSR in annual reports, charitable contributions, Kinder, 
Lydenberg and Domini database (KLD) ratings, etc.) as well as in the financial risk measures. 
The latter can be further subdivided into market risk measures (standard deviation of firms’ 
stock returns, stock return beta) and accounting risk measures (e.g. long term debt to assets, 
debt to equity ratio, volatility of ROA, etc.).  Such variation in the operationalization of CSP 
and CFP greatly diminishes the comparability of results. In response, Orlitzky and Benjamin 
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(2001) perform a statistical meta-analysis of these studies using an integrated sample of 6,186 
observations and conclude that the true score correlation coefficient (ρ) between CSP and risk 
is negative. The association appears to be stronger for market risk (ρ = –0.21) than for 
accounting risk (ρ = -0.09). Furthermore, by testing the temporal sequence, the authors are 
able to conclude that “the negative correlation between prior CSP and subsequent risk is 
about twice as large as the correlation between prior risk and subsequent CSP” (p.387).   
 More recently, the study of Salama, Anderson, and Toms, (2009) provides some 
evidence on the nature of the link between Community and Environmental Responsibility 
(CER) rankings and systematic firm risk in the British context. Using cross-industrial UK 
panel data between 1994 and 2006, leading to a total sample size of 1,625 observations, the 
authors find a negative and statistically significant relationship between the two variables, 
with CER being an antecedent of financial risk. However, the sensitivity of the coefficient of 
this association, as estimated by random-effects GLS regression, is just -0.028, significant at 
the 5% level. This is one of the very few studies of the field where a significantly large set of 
longitudinal data is employed. However, the authors do not further investigate the dynamics 
of the CER–firm risk association by attempting to identify possible moderators in the CSP–
risk link, such as the possible impact of market volatility conditions. Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008) strictly focus on the environmental dimension of CSP and show that environmental 
risk management can effectively lead to a lower cost of equity capital through different 
pathways, including a lowering of systematic risk and increased tax benefits. The authors 
only use data from 2001 which makes their analysis cross-sectional.  
 In addition, Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, (2009) build on Godfrey’s previous 
theoretical contribution (Godfrey, 2005) to investigate whether CSP carries insurance-like 
properties regarding the effect on stock market value of negative firm-specific, rather than 
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industry or economy wide, events (p.426). Thus, they conduct an event study analysis upon 
the negative legal and regulatory actions taken against firms and find evidence that risks are 
mitigated by CSP but that wealth-protective effects are associated with activities that target a 
firm’s secondary stakeholders, i.e. those who can affect the firm’s primary stakeholders, but 
are not directly essential to the operation of the business. The fine-grained approach of this 
study, which employs detailed information about events that carry the potential for 
catastrophic reputational harm for individual companies, is appropriate in the context of the 
discrete, idiosyncratic type of association between CSP and firm risk hypothesized (Godfrey, 
2005).  However, the focus upon very specific types of negative events hinders more 
generalized inferences regarding the wealth-protective effects of CSP activities as 
total/systematic market risk is generated by not only negative legal and regulatory events but 
also a host of other sources of uncertainty in the business environment. Similarly, Luo and 
Bhattacharya (2009) also predominantly look at the effect of CSP on idiosyncratic risk and 
find the two to be negative related. They do, however, perform some additional analysis 
which also indicates the existence of a negative association between CSP and systematic firm 
risk. 
 In summary, the extant literature on the effect of CSP on financial risk is sparse and 
problematic, and our study seeks to address a number of the substantive limitations of 
previous work concerning both the data and methodology employed. We use longitudinal 
data from the KLD database for S&P 500 companies between the years 1992 and 2009. This 
provides a large sample of approximately 7,000 firm–year observations (more than the 
integrated sample of 6,186 observations pooled by Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) for their 
meta-analysis). The great heterogeneity of the sample in both cross-section (more than 760 
corporate entities) and time period (18 years of data) facilitates investigation of the variability 
of the CSP–risk relationship across both industries and time. In the words of Ullman (1985): 
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“Longitudinal studies could provide insights into how strategies change as a function of 
shifting stakeholder power or economic performance.” To the knowledge of the authors, this 
constitutes one of the largest samples ever to be used in the context of the CSP–risk link, as 
well as in CSP–CFP research as a whole. 
 In our study, we will employ a wide spectrum of risk metrics that may capture the 
wealth-protective effects of strong CSP. While standard measures are used for the sake of 
comparability with previous studies, we also make novel use of downside risk metrics. 
Furthermore, the addition of utility measures further extends the analysis to incorporate risk, 
return and higher moments. 
 
II. Theoretical Background and Development of 
Hypotheses 
 
 A number of conceptual arguments, mostly emanating from instrumental stakeholder 
theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995), support a view in favor of the existence 
of a negative relationship between CSP and financial risk. It could be argued that a company 
which is consistently socially and environmentally responsible should, in the course of time, 
obtain the fruits of this strategic posture by experiencing fewer downward adjustments and 
less volatility in its share price (compared to less socially responsible firms) or, equivalently, 
that firms having been shown to be involved in controversial, socially and/or environmentally 
irresponsible activities would be exposed to a higher degree of stock market risk. 
 High levels of CSP can be associated with low financial risk through, inter alia, lower 
probabilities of suffering legal prosecutions and fines, less stringent regulatory controls, more 
stable relations with the government and the financial community (McGuire et al., 1988), 
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customer loyalty and a supportive environment on the parts of employees and communities 
during times of crisis. All of these beneficial implications can lead to reductions of the 
various operational risks that a company faces in terms of its profitability and overall 
viability. Also, high firm social performance may be considered to be a sign of superior 
management skills – the so called “good management hypothesis” (Waddock and Graves, 
1997, p.306), thus indicating a firm which is likely to be characterized by more effective 
business and financial planning and consequently, by improved financial stability. Lastly, 
there is Godfrey’s (2005) rationale, according to which better protection of corporate 
reputational and relational wealth is achieved by higher degrees of CSP through the 
generation of mens rea value and positive moral capital that mitigate negative assessments of 
corporate actions. The first two arguments describe wealth-protective CSP effects of a more 
generic nature that are likely to shield the firm from the negative impacts of wide ranging, 
systemic economic shocks while the last one illustrates the risk-reductive effects of CSP in 
the presence of negative firm related events. We will concentrate on the former types of 
arguments, recognizing that, as Godfrey et al. (2009) correctly point out “The role of firm-
specific characteristics in the face of common events clearly yields illumination” (p.426). 
Given all of the above, this study is based on the instrumental stakeholder theory framework 
and as such will attempt to test whether in fact a company that engages in socially responsible 
(irresponsible) behavior will decrease (increase) its financial risk through that behavior. So 
ultimately, what is tested is summarized in the following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: CSP negatively affects market risk at the firm level. 
 Due to the complexity in defining and assessing CSP, it is necessary to further clarify 
what is meant by the term CSP for the purpose of this study. In particular, it is imperative to 
differentiate between socially responsible and irresponsible corporate activities. The 
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multidimensionality of the notion of CSP makes it possible for a company to do well with 
regards to the societal demands of a particular set of stakeholders (e.g. having good 
relationships with employees) and less well with regards to others (e.g. being on bad terms 
with local communities). To rephrase, if CSP is seen as a measure of the moral character of a 
particular firm then it seems plausible that this company may not be deemed to be purely 
good or purely bad, but both, according to the focus on particular social issues. 
 In addition, as McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd (2003) have noted, a firm may be both 
socially responsible and socially irresponsible even along a single dimension of social 
performance. For example, according to the KLD STATS dataset, in the year 2000, Exxon 
Mobil appeared to be a company that had very strong retirement benefits programs for its 
employees (thus being socially responsible with regards to employee relations) but at the 
same time had been involved in major controversies concerning workforce health and safety 
issues (thus being socially irresponsible in the dimension of employee relations).
3
 It is 
therefore evident that an assessment of the social performance of this firm is not a 
straightforward task even with a sole focus that is upon a relatively narrowly defined 
dimension of CSP. 
 To address this complexity in social performance, we follow the findings of Mattingly 
and Berman (2006) on the distinction between corporate socially responsible actions and 
corporate socially irresponsible actions and their conclusion that “positive and negative 
social actions are both empirically and conceptually distinct constructs and should not be 
combined in future research” (p. 20). They argue that it is unreasonable to assume that 
stakeholders will react to responsible and irresponsible behavior in opposite yet symmetrical 
manners. To make no such assumption, we will refine Hypothesis 1 as follows:  
                                                          
3
 The details of this database are discussed in Section III of the study. 
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Hypothesis 1a: Corporate socially responsible actions and practices lead to reduced levels of 
firm financial risk 
Hypothesis 1b: Corporate socially irresponsible actions and practices lead to increased 
levels of firm financial risk   
 Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that corporate social responsibility and 
corporate social irresponsibility affect a firm’s bottom line to differing magnitudes. Wood 
and Jones (1995) noted in their review that event studies employing market-based measures 
of CFP show a tendency for poor social performance to inflict financial harm but do not show 
evidence of a financial boon from strong social performance. Similarly, Meijer and Schuyt 
(2005) find that while consumers expect a firm’s CSP not to fall below some minimum 
threshold (or else they will boycott), high levels of social responsibility do not bring 
significantly increased product sales. More recently, it has been shown that “the economic 
impacts [of CSP] are more positive for issues reducing negative externalities than for issues 
generating positive externalities” (Lankoski, 2009, p.218). For the KLD rating framework, 
this means that, ceteris paribus, a firm is likely to improve its economic performance (and 
decrease the associated firm risk) more if it manages to decrease its social/environmental 
concerns rather than increasing its respective strengths. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Social/Environmental strengths are less negatively related to financial risk 
than social/environmental concerns are positively related to financial risk. 
 There has also been some debate in the empirical CSP–CFP literature about the 
appropriate way to handle social performance data, i.e., whether they should be amalgamated 
into an aggregate, multidimensional measure (Aupperle and Pham, 1989) or if they should be 
treated as a heterogenous set of corporate actions (Hillman and Keim, 2001). In order to 
reflect the qualitative variation across the dimensions of CSP – from charitable community 
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projects to the adoption of pollution-reduction technology and equal opportunity employment 
practices, and so on – we will separately analyze each of a number of disparate components 
of CSP as well as an aggregate measure of performance. 
 Our use of longitudinal data provides an opportunity to investigate dynamics in the 
CSP–market risk link, and in particular, examine how this link is moderated in the context of 
high overall market volatility. In this connection, it is worth noting that Orlitzky and 
Benjamin (2001) argue that after the burst of the dot.com stock market bubble, investors were 
more keenly focused upon the underlying risk associated with equity investments and less 
mindful of capital gains and dividends. More generally, finance and economics literature also 
suggests a stylized fact that aggregate risk aversion and risk premia change counter-cyclically 
across time.
4
 If so, one would expect the relationship between CSP and financial risk to be 
more pronounced during the times of ‘lean cows’. In addition, Chen, Guo, and Tay, (2010) 
suggest that corporations are more likely to implement practices that may reduce firm risk 
during periods of economic hardship. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3a: In the presence of conditions of high market volatility, the association 
between CSP and financial risk is expected to be stronger than otherwise. 
 The same line of reasoning also implies that the CSP–risk link should be stronger for 
investors with higher risk aversion than for more risk tolerant investors. This should be 
depicted when utility measures are used, since, as risk aversion increases, risk effects tend to 
prevail over mean return effects. So a more general form of Hypothesis 3a would be: 
                                                          
4
 This is supported by habit formation models for example like those proposed by Abel 
(1990), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
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Hypothesis 3b:  The relationship between corporate social behavior and financial risk will be 
more pronounced as average investor risk aversion increases. 
Having outlined the theoretical background and stated the hypotheses of this study, we 
proceed to discuss the intuition behind the selection and construction of the variables that are 
used in the specification of the econometric models. 
 
III. Independent, Dependent and Control Variables 
A. Independent variables: The KLD database and CSP measures  
 Amidst all CSP measures, the ones that stand out are those that are based on what has, 
with the course of time, become “the best-researched and most comprehensive” (Wood and 
Jones, 1995) database for social performance: the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
database. KLD is a rating service which assesses a great number of firms with regard to their 
strengths and concerns on a series of dimensions of CSP that are considered to be of interest.
5
 
To be more specific, companies are rated on multiple indicators within seven “qualitative 
issue areas” (these being community relations, diversity issues, employee programs, 
environment issues, product safety and quality, corporate governance, and human rights) as 
well as six controversial business issues (which examine the extent to which a firm is 
involved with military contracting, nuclear power, firearms, alcohol, tobacco, or gambling). 
The rating is done separately on strengths and concerns of the same qualitative issue area 
while controversial business issues by definition are only rated on concerns. All the ratings 
are binary, with 1 representing the presence of a particular strength/concern and 0 
                                                          
5
 KLD became part of MSCI as from June 2010. 
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representing its absence. KLD uses sources both internal to the firm (e.g. annual reports) and 
external (e.g. articles in the business press) to conduct year-by-year assessments of the social 
performance of 650 firms, including all the firms listed in the S&P 500 Composite Index and 
the ones listed in the Domini 400 Social Index. Since 2001, KLD has expanded its coverage 
universe to incorporate the largest 1000 US companies in terms of market value, an 
expansion which advanced further in 2003 with the inclusion of the 3000 largest US firms. 
Independent researchers consistently apply the aforementioned criteria and discuss 
ambiguous judgments to minimize the subjectivity of the whole process. Given all these 
advantageous attributes, it constitutes no great surprise that scholars of the field have 
characterized the KLD dataset as being “the de facto research standard at the moment” for 
measuring CSP (Waddock, 2003, p. 369). Thus, we elect to use the KLD database and, 
specifically, KLD STATS (standing for Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Statistical Tool for 
Analyzing Trends in Social & Environmental Performance) for this study. The core part of 
our work is centered on the companies listed in the S&P 500 composite index. The focus of 
the study on such a widely used benchmark index helps to increase the coverage of firm–year 
observations by making use of nearly the entire relevant dataset, starting in 1991 and ending 
in 2008.  
 Following Hillman and Keim (2001), we concentrate on those qualitative business 
issues that can be directly associated with specific, primary stakeholder groups and as such 
may be considered focal for the implementation of successful stakeholder management. In 
this sense, we disregard the entire set of controversial business issues as being representative 
of corporate action that Hillman and Keim (2001) deem as “social issues participation”. 
Furthermore, to fully capitalize on the length of the dataset, as well as for the sake of 
consistency and comparability to previous studies, we only use the omnipresent indicators of 
each qualitative business issue. This process leads to the selection and utilization of the 
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indicators that are depicted in Figure 1. In accordance with the results of Mattingly and 
Berman (2006) on the taxonomy within the KLD data, we do not combine strengths and 
concerns of the same issue areas since they appear to be distinct constructs.
6
  
 We implement the above principles and follow two different ways of combining the 
KLD data in order to make the most of the information contained in it. Firstly, we attempt to 
use the individual components of the KLD database. Doing so adds to both the exactness and 
variability of our conclusions, as it allows us to investigate the relationships between many 
different facets of the wide spectrum of corporate social action and financial risk.  
Consequently, we add all the ratings of the indicators for the strength/concerns of a particular 
qualitative business issue and then divide the sum of those ratings by the number of 
indicators of the specific issue area. The general formula for calculating any individual 
component for a particular firm is: 
                         
1
Respective Indicators' ratings
COMP= ,   (1)
n
n
i

 
                                                          
6
 However, we elect not to use the Mattingly and Berman (2006) classification of CSP actions 
underlying the KLD social ratings data. We do this due to the fact that this classification is 
tailored to the manner in which CSP outcomes are determined – for example, relatively 
discretionary behavior influenced by broader institutional positioning on CSR, or operational 
matters driven by the nature of the core business activities. So, we believe that these 
categories are not an appropriate fit for our paper because we are focused upon the manner in 
which CSP is perceived by investors. Given this, there is an imperative to instead employ 
categories that reflect the way in which different parts of CSP might be differently perceived 
by external audiences, hence, we split CSP according to the type of corporate social action. 
  
 
18 
where n is the number of indicators that are relevant to the particular issue area.  
 Although the information that can be gained by following the above procedure is 
valuable, it would be interesting to seek an aggregation of the individual components of 
social activity that maintains the dichotomy between strengths and concerns. The comparison 
of the results of a model using an aggregate KLD measure with those of the individual 
components model would help conclude whether in fact combining various features of social 
performance to create “a single, monolithic construct” (Godfrey et al., 2009, p.426) dilutes 
the finer-grained effects of one-dimensional CSP.  
 In order to create the “Aggregate Strengths” and “Aggregate Concerns” measures, we 
simply add the respective individual strengths/concerns components which we previously 
constructed and then divide the sum by five in order for the slope coefficients that will be 
estimated to be comparable with those of the individual components. The implied assumption 
is that each type of social action is given equal weighting so that employee programs, for 
example, are considered just as important as product safety and quality. This is done in 
accordance with the work of Hillman and Keim (2001) and is due to the lack of conceptual 
work that would shed light on the effort to quantify the relative importance among the 
various facets of CSP. Ruf et al. (2001) have tried to address this issue by implementing the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), but the alleged time sensitivity in the assessment of 
various CSP dimensions – which would require a periodic update of the survey and the 
implementation of AHP – makes their results unfit for use in this study. Thus, equal 
importance across CSP dimensions in the construction of the aggregate measure is an 
unavoidable yet practical compromise. The same logic applies for the equal importance 
weighting of the various indicators in the construction of each of the individual strengths and 
concerns components. So the formula for calculating the “Aggregate Strengths” measure is: 
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1
AGGS= (COMS + DIVS + EMPS +ENVS +PSQS),  (2) 
5
  
where COMS stands for the Community strengths component, DIVS stands for Diversity 
strengths, EMPS stands for Employment strengths, ENVS stands for Environment strengths 
and PSQS for Product Safety and Quality strengths. Analogously for “Aggregate Concerns”:                               
          
1
AGGC= (COMC + DIVC + EMPC +ENVC +PSQC),  (3)
5
  
with the notation being completely equivalent to that of Equation (2).         
B. Dependent variables: Financial risk and utility measures 
 Picking one measure that captures market risk is not a straightforward task. Financial 
economists, mathematicians, and risk managers have struggled for decades in order to create 
new risk metrics with different properties and characteristics. So, to improve the robustness 
of this study, an array of financial risk measures with different qualities will be utilized. 
Similarities in results across risk measures will buttress one another while any differences in 
the conclusions drawn from the use of each measure are likely to shed more light on the 
strength of the alleged wealth-protective effects of CSP.   
 Firstly, for the sake of simplicity, comparability with previous research and renewal 
of the relevant literature with updated information, a classical financial risk measure will be 
employed, namely the beta of the returns of the firms’ shares. It is the most widely used 
measure of systematic risk and as such is often used instead of standard deviation.
7
  Its 
calculation is given by: 
                                                          
7
 Under traditional portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1991), the total risk that a security bears can be divided into 
systematic risk arising from broad factors that affect the entire universe of securities and idiosyncratic risk 
which arises from industry/firm-specific factors. Through diversification, portfolios bearing no idiosyncratic risk 
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it i mt m
im 2
mt m
E[(R -μ )(R -μ )]
β =  (4)
E[(R -μ )]
,
 
where βim is the beta of firm i when the market proxy is m, μi is the average value of the  
returns of firm i, Rmt is the observed return of the market proxy (S&P 500) at time t and μm is 
the average value of those returns.  
 In addition to the use of the aforementioned metric, this study makes an original 
contribution to the CSP–CFP literature with the introduction of downside risk measures.8 The 
motivation for the use of these measures arises from several factors. Firstly, conventional risk 
measures like beta are appropriate when the distributions of the returns of the assets under 
consideration are symmetric (such as in the case of a normal distribution). In this situation, 
standard risk measures (SRMs) and downside risk measures (DRMs) will produce the same 
results. However, when the distributions of returns are asymmetric (DeFusco, Karels, and 
Muralidhar, 1996) then either the downside price fluctuations will have a dominating effect 
over the upside or the other way around. Specifically, if the distribution of returns is 
negatively skewed or “skewed to the left” (so that skewness is smaller than 0), SRMs 
underestimate risk because they underestimate the proportion of extreme negative deviations 
from expectation, which are the true source of anxiety for the investor. Since SRMs and 
DRMs will generate different measurements of financial risk and since it seems more 
intuitive to think of financial risk as the probability of a downward movement (rather that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
can be constructed so that the investor is only compensated for the market risk of his investments. That is why it 
is argued that only the systematic risk of a security matters and, hence, this study employs beta as a measure of 
financial risk rather than standard deviation. 
 
8
 Luo and Bhattacharya (2009) mention the existence of models that use downside equity 
betas but do not use such a model in their study. 
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general price instability), DRMs are more appropriate. Secondly, it has been argued that 
“losses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991 p.1039), a sort of loss aversion utility theory, with the 
implication being that investors are more sensitive towards downside risk and are thus likely 
to require a significant premium for their exposures in assets with downside risk.  
 These first two arguments are valid whether we refer to the context of the financial 
effects of CSP or not. A more well-focussed argument in favor of the use of DRMs is that 
they are especially compatible with Godfrey’s (2005) arguments about the insurance effects 
that CSP will have on CFP. Following this line of reasoning, financial risk should be depicted 
as the likelihood of a downward adjustment in the stock prices of socially irresponsible firms 
instead of a general instability and variability of those prices. 
 The measure of downside risk that will be applied is downside beta. It must be noted 
that there is no consensus in the financial literature about what is the most appropriate 
definition, and subsequently method for estimation, of the downside beta. The main issue in 
question is the minimum threshold that a market participant should use to evaluate the returns 
of the asset he has invested in. Risk will then be characterized by the downside deviations 
from this target. We consider two of the downside betas proposed in the literature. 
 The first comes from the work of Bawa and Lindenberg (1977), who use the risk free 
rate as the target return and the second is that introduced by Harlow and Rao (1989) who 
instead use the mean market return as a threshold. The respective formulae are: 
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where  Ri and Rm are the returns on security i and the market portfolio, respectively, μi  and 
μm are the mean returns of security i and the market portfolio, respectively and Rf is the risk 
free rate (3 month T-Bill rate). 
 Until this point, we have focused solely on the risk connected to the second moment 
of returns (although the DRMs that we mentioned correct the biases in the measurement of 
risk that may be incurred due to high negative values of the third moment). An examination 
of the higher moments of the distribution of asset returns would significantly enrich the 
analysis by allowing a more in-depth assessment of the nature of the effects of CSP on 
financial risk. For example, it may be that specific types of social and environmental firm 
actions that produce positive (negative) externalities affect the skewness of the distribution of 
its stock returns and tilt the distribution to the right (left). Or that a firm that is characterized 
by particularly mixed social performance (e.g. scoring high on both strengths and concerns 
on various business issues) may have a more leptokurtic distribution of stock returns, as there 
is an increased probability of extreme results occurring, either positive or negative. 
Additionally, the inclusion of the mean return in a utility measure may provide hints 
regarding the extent to which the magnitude of the alleged risk-reduction effects of CSP is 
offset by a proportionate reduction in asset returns.  
 To test the effect that CSP has on investors’ utility, we apply the extension of the 
mean–variance criterion to higher moments. This criterion has many advantageous 
characteristics. It can be applied when an investor’s utility is described by the negative 
exponential utility function, one of the most widely used such functions. Furthermore, and in 
contrast to the mean–variance criterion, one does not need to additionally assume 
distributional normality of returns in order to use the criterion’s extension to higher moments. 
In fact, it is not even necessary for the distribution of returns to be symmetric or mesokurtic 
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since the criterion explicitly incorporates the third and fourth moments of the distribution, a 
highly desirable property which allows for non-parametric empirical applications. The fourth 
order approximation of the certainty equivalent
9
 that is associated with the negative 
exponential utility function is given by the formula: 
         
2 2 3 3 41
, (7)
2 6 24
CE
 
        
 
 where μ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation, τ is the skewness, κ  is the kurtosis of the 
asset returns and γ is the investor’s absolute risk aversion. We will interchange between using 
γ values of 2, 5, and 20 in order to capture a very wide range of investor preferences. It 
should also be noted that this measure does not incorporate the non-financial utility that some 
investors may derive from investing in firms with high CSR standards (Renneboo, Ter Horst, 
and Zhang 2008b) since this study is restricted to examining the effects of CSP on financial 
risk and economic utility. 
 
C. Control variables 
 This subsection describes the series of variables that are used in the model 
specifications in an effort to remove the impact of non-CSP factors and, accordingly, to zoom 
in on the effects of CSP variables on financial risk per se. Furthermore, this set of variables is 
employed in order to ensure as far as possible that the effect of CSP on firm financial risk is 
not spurious and merely the artifact of an omitted variable bias. 
                                                          
9
 The monetary amount that has the same utility as the expected utility of an uncertain 
investment. 
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 i) Size: Ln(Market Value). Larger firms are generally thought of as being less risky 
than smaller firms. This seems to be a sensible statement especially if one considers the 
firms’ probabilities of default. Large firms are inherently more competent in enduring 
adverse economic shocks.  Furthermore, it has been argued that firm size is proportionally 
negatively related to asset return variance (Beaver, Ketter, and Scholes, 1970, p.662) and that 
reputational effects are higher for larger firms, thus making banks view them as less risky and 
reduce the yields that they charge them (Diamond, 1991). Following the norm, the logarithm 
of firm size, as captured by stock market capitalization, is used to correct for the skewness of 
the measure.  
 ii) Market to Book Value (MTBV) ratio. Due to a significant number of missing 
values in the Datastream database, we construct a proxy for this ratio by dividing firm market 
value by the respective book value of common equity. As Fama and French (1992) note in 
their seminal work on the cross-sections of expected stock returns, it is possible that the 
reciprocal of MTBV captures risk which is associated with the distress factor of Chan and 
Chen (1991). Specifically, it is argued that companies the market deems to have poor 
prospects are characterized by lower stock prices and higher book to market ratios (lower 
MTBV ratios) than companies with stronger prospects (p.428).  However, these stronger 
prospects may lead to greater variability in profitability and capital market performance. This 
“growth vs. value” differentiation of firms may explain why analysts often consider the stock 
of a company with low MTBV to be a less risky investment, with book value seen as the 
minimum threshold of firm equity. 
 iii) Gearing: Total Debt to Common Equity (TDCE) ratio. Again, instead of directly 
using a gearing measure, we prefer to construct this proxy in order to avoid having a 
multitude of missing observations for this variable. An excessively high ratio of financial 
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leverage indicates significant indebtedness which may lead to a firm’s difficulty in meeting 
the demands of its creditors and as such, worsen its viability. In addition, the classic study of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) shows that the higher a firm’s debt, the higher the volatility of 
the earnings stream towards its stockholders which is why “the expected rate of return … on 
the stock of any company… is a linear function of [its] leverage” (p.271). 
 iv) Dividend Yield. Dividend yield on a company stock is the ratio of the dividend per 
share to the price per share of that stock. Although there is no consensus in the relevant 
literature, there is evidence which suggests that stocks having higher dividend yields are also 
characterized by higher risk adjusted total returns than stocks paying no or low dividends 
(Blume,1980). Arguably, a constant, high expected flow of dividends is likely to reduce the 
volatility and systematic risk of stock prices due to duration and information effects.
10
 Also, 
dividend yield can be thought to have a signaling effect regarding management’s perception 
of the uncertainty of future earnings (Beaver et al., 1970, p.660)  i.e. the higher the dividend 
yield the less the uncertainty and vice versa.  
 v) Research and Development (R&D) intensity:  R&D Expenditure to Total Sales 
ratio. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) present evidence which supports the position that a 
significant part of the CSP–CFP literature is based on mis-specified models, since the R&D 
expenditure is not included. This variable has been found to be an important determinant of 
firm performance, and is argued to also be positively correlated with CSP, as CSP is thought 
of as a stream of product and process innovations which are generated by R&D expenditures. 
The attempt to create such innovations constitutes an inherently risky project. Because of 
                                                          
10
 The term “duration effect” is used to imply that high dividend yield provides more cash 
flow in the short term. If dividend policy is assumed to remain stable then high dividend 
stocks will have a shorter duration. 
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this, the exclusion of this variable may lead to an omitted variable bias as discussed above, 
which results in biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. 
 vi) Liquidity:
11
 Current ratio. The current ratio is calculated by dividing a firm’s book 
value of current assets by that of its current liabilities. It is indicative of the firm’s ability to 
remain solvent in the short run. The current ratio is one of the ratios most widely used to 
assess a firm’s liquidity risk. Obviously, the lower the current ratio, the higher the liquidity 
risk for a company, a feature which may be depicted by increased stock price fluctuations for 
that firm.  
 vii) Industry classification. We use the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) at its 
second level of analysis, i.e., a taxonomy of companies according to supersectors. This results 
in the construction of a total of 19 industry dummy variables. These are: Oil & Gas, 
Chemicals, Basic Resources, Construction & Materials, Industrial Goods & Services, 
Automobiles & Parts, Food & Beverage, Personal & Household Goods, Health Care, Retail, 
Media, Travel & Leisure, Telecommunications, Utilities, Banks, Insurance, Real Estate, 
Financial Services, and Technology.  The inclusion of these dummy variables seems 
appropriate given the inherent variability in the risk attributes across supersectors. However, 
as the analysis is restricted to US firms, there is no need to include control variables for 
country effects. 
 
                                                          
11
 Note that during this discussion we have used the term “liquidity” to refer to a firm’s funding liquidity and not 
to the liquidity of the market where the firm’s stock is traded, the latter being an irrelevant issue in the case of 
the very actively traded, highly liquid S&P 500 stocks of this sample. Funding liquidity is defined as a firm’s 
ability to settle obligations with immediacy and the respective risk is driven by the possibility that over a 
specific horizon a firm will become unable to settle obligations with immediacy (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 
2009, pp.10-11). Market liquidity is defined as the ability to trade large size quickly, at low cost, when you want 
to trade (Harris, 2003, p.394).  
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IV. Methodology  
A. Sample construction 
 As has been already stated, our initial sample consists of all the companies listed in 
the S&P 500 Composite Index and rated by KLD on their corporate social performance at 
some point(s) during the period between 1991 and 2008. This translates to an unbalanced 
panel dataset of 9,000 firm–year observations. KLD STATS provides the names and tickers 
of the companies it rates and since 1995 also uses their respective CUSIPs but unfortunately 
has never used Datastream codes. There are several roundabout ways to match the year by 
year list of S&P 500 companies with their Datastream identifying codes but all of them lead 
to a great loss of firm–year observations and they bear the additional risk of including the 
wrong type of stock for those companies that are listed on several exchanges. To avoid such 
hazards, a methodical, manual scrutinization and subsequent matching of each firm to its 
respective Datastream code was conducted on a one-by-one basis. When a firm’s stock was 
traded on several exchanges, the code of the stock being traded at the main stock exchange 
was used, when such an indication was available, or else the firm was dropped from the 
sample. Preferred stocks were also dropped from the sample.  
 Overall, for the estimation of our basic models, a series of variables that have been 
mentioned in Section III had to be used. For the construction of the various financial risk and 
utility measures, we calculated the weekly log–returns of the prices of the Total Return Index 
(TRI, Datastream code: RI) for each share.
12
 For the calculation of the beta factor and the 
downside beta metrics, a market proxy had to be used. The obvious choice, given the dataset, 
                                                          
12
 The TRI assumes the reinvestment of distributed dividends so that both pure capital gains 
and dividend payouts are included in the calculation of stock returns. 
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was the S&P 500 itself (Datastream code: S&PCOMP). We also gathered data for all the 
control variables that we employed.
13
 After dropping all firm–year observations for which at 
least one of the variables needed is missing, our sample consists of 6,986 firm–year 
observations (a total of N=769 different firms over a period of T=18 years).
14
  
 
B. Model specification 
 As has been thoroughly explained in the previous section of the study, we estimate 
three types of models, each offering a different piece of information regarding the 
relationship between CSP and financial risk. The first one is the “individual components” 
model:  
      
10
,it i j jit-1 11 it-1 12 it-1 13 it-1 14 it-1 it
j=1
RM =α + β COMP +β MV +β MTBV +β DY +β TDCE +ε (8)
 
where RMit is the risk or utility measure for firm i in year t, αi is the time invariant intercept 
for firm i, βs are the slope coefficients of the respective factors, COMPjit-1 is the individual 
component j (strengths and concerns of the five qualitative issue areas of interest: community 
relations, diversity issues, employee programs, environment issues, product safety and 
quality), MVit-1  is the market capitalization, MTBVit-1 is the market to book value ratio, DYit-
                                                          
13 Note that the core models do not include R&D intensity and liquidity as control variables. 
These factors are added later as robustness checks.  As a result, the filtering process 
mentioned here does not concern these two variables. 
14
 We choose to use this unbalanced panel of data rather than extracting a balanced subpanel from it, by either 
maximizing the number of firms observed (restricted maximization in the cross-sectional dimension) or by 
maximizing the average number of observations per firm (restricted maximization in the time series dimension) 
because either of these methods would lead to a huge loss in efficiency (Baltagi and Chang, 1994).  
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1 is the dividend yield, TDCEit-1 is the total debt to common equity ratio, all referring to  firm 
i in year t-1, and εit is the respective disturbance term.
15
                 
 The second model is the “aggregate strengths/concerns” model: 
      
,it i 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 4 it-1 5 it-1 6 it-1 itRM =α +β AGGS +β AGGC +β MV +β MTBV +β DY +β TDCE +ε (9)  
where the notation for most terms is identical to that of equation (8), AGGSit-1 is the measure 
of aggregate CSP strengths (Equation (2)) and AGGCit-1 the measure of aggregate CSP 
concerns (Equation (3)) for firm i in year t-1.  
 For every model, a variety of risk/utility measures will be used (beta, downside risk 
metrics plus the extension of the certainty equivalent to higher moments for different values 
of absolute risk aversion), resulting in multiple estimations. In all models, the independent 
variables are lagged. This is done for several reasons. Firstly, it has been clearly stated that 
this study is oriented towards the examination of a relationship between CSP and market risk 
where CSP is the cause and subsequent levels of firm risk are the effect. Furthermore, lagging 
the CSP measures and control variables helps this study escape the alleged endogeneity 
problems and simultaneity bias that may arise due to a contemporaneous bidirectional 
causality of CSP and risk. Also, as the manual of KLD STATS reveals, although the data 
collection process and appraisal of firm social performance is an ongoing, continuous 
process, KLD actually assembles the data at the end of each calendar year, and compiles the 
data into the spreadsheets at the beginning of the next year (pp. 4-5). So, following the 
rationale of Godfrey et al. (2009), lagging our social/environmental variables by one year 
helps to “ensure that the ratings for each firm were public knowledge” (p.434) and so had 
                                                          
15
 The fixed effects estimation model is applied and its details will be discussed in subsection 
C.  
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already started to become incorporated by the markets in the form of informative prices. 
Hence, when we use CSP measures from year t-1, we start collecting stock price data from 
the second week of year t to calculate the respective risk/utility metrics. 
 In addition, in order to avoid including in the analysis outliers that may heavily 
influence the results, all the risk and utility measures along with the financial control 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
16
 This is important since firm–year observations that 
are characterized by extremely high volatility are likely to sway the goodness of fit of the 
model towards their direction.  
C. Panel data econometrics 
Choosing the correct panel data regression model is crucial in empirical analysis. The 
efficiency and consistency of the estimated intercepts and slope coefficients is dependent on 
the choice of the appropriate estimator, each having characteristic properties. The first choice 
the researcher has to make concerns the selection of a fixed or random effects model. Given 
the fact that this study is restricted to large, American, publicly traded firms that have been 
included in the S&P 500 Composite Index, the fixed effects model appears to be the most 
intuitive option because as Baltagi (2005) notes: “The fixed effects model is an appropriate 
specification if we are focussing on a specific set of N firms … and our inference is restricted 
to the behavior of this set of firms” (p. 12). The random effects model on the other hand is 
                                                          
16
 Winsorization is a transformation process in which the values of outliers are replaced by a 
specific threshold value (in this case, the bottom and top 1% of the observations are replaced 
by the 1st and 99th percentile of the relevant empirical distribution respectively). In addition, 
pooled quantile regressions are also estimated and verify the robustness of the analysis to 
outliers. 
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preferred when the firms of the dataset are assumed to represent random draws from a larger 
population (Baltagi, 2005, p.14), which is not the case in this instance. In addition, estimating 
models (8) and (9) using random effects and performing Hausman tests produces results that 
strongly support the use of fixed effects in the estimation.
17
 Another possible method to use is 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). This approach is the most restrictive of the methods as it 
specifies constant coefficients for both intercepts and slopes (whereas fixed effects, for 
example, specifies constant slope coefficients but allows the intercepts to be different 
between firms). The pooled OLS estimator is inconsistent when the fixed effects estimator is 
appropriate (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.699).  Performing likelihood ratio redundant fixed 
effects tests results in a strong rejection of the null hypothesis that these effects are redundant. 
So the pooled OLS method is inappropriate. 
 Given the above discussion, it appears that the fixed effects estimators are the most 
appropriate to use in this study. The notation of Equations (8) and (9) has taken this factor 
into account, which is why the intercept term is αi , indicating that it varies across firms but is 
time invariant. Notice that in all equations, the set of industry dummy variables is not 
explicitly used in the specification because this piece of cross-sectional heterogeneity is 
constant over time (assuming that a company does not significantly alter its business 
orientation) and as such is captured by the intercepts.      
 Another issue of importance when dealing with panel data sets is the estimation of 
robust standard errors. If the residuals of the model for a given firm are correlated across 
years (time-series dependence) or the residuals for a given year are correlated across firms 
(cross-sectional dependence) then the standard errors of the estimated coefficients will be 
upward or downward biased. In the latter case, the statistical significance of the results of the 
                                                          
17 Results are not reported but are available by the authors upon request. 
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study will be overestimated and the conclusions drawn may be invalid. Indeed, a lot of 
studies in the finance literature have either completely ignored this issue or have addressed it 
in an inappropriate manner (Petersen, 2009, pp.435-436). Recognizing the implications of 
this matter, a significant effort is made to effectively tackle it.   
 There is reason to expect that time-series dependence may arise in the residuals of the 
models since CSP is usually relatively constant for the same firms and social/environmental 
dimensions across time. Persistence in the application of CSR principles appears the most 
reasonable way to ensure the accruement of its long-run beneficial economic impacts. Taking 
a look at the bar schematics of the various CSP components (both strengths and concerns) for 
the individual cross-sections (firms) reinforces this expectation: The vast majority of firms 
have ratings that are persistently high or persistently low throughout the years. The inclusion 
of fixed effects (dummy variables) in the specified models deals with this issue and leads to 
unbiased standard errors, as long as this time-series dependence is fixed and not time-
decreasing (Petersen, 2009, p.464). On the other hand, there are no particular grounds to 
anticipate that cross-sectional dependence will arise in the residuals of the fixed effects 
model. Furthermore, the detection of such dependence is not a straightforward process 
considering both the two-dimensional nature of the residuals and the fact that the cross-
sections are randomly (alphabetically) stacked. As a rule of the thumb, Breusch–Godfrey 
serial correlation LM tests on the cross-sectional samples (year by year) are performed and do 
not, on the whole, provide significant indications of the existence of cross-sectional 
dependence.
18
 Following the same rationale, performing White’s heteroskedasticity tests in 
                                                          
18
 With three different models, many different dependent variables that are alternatively used 
for each model and 18 different years, there are several hundreds of such tests that are 
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the cross-sectional, year-by-year samples provides evidence of cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals. To account for this, the diagonal White cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity robust coefficient covariance estimator (adjusted for panel data) is applied. 
Henceforth, and unless otherwise noted, all the t-statistics reported will be the outcome of the 
implementation of the above processes which should lead to the estimation of robust standard 
errors.  
V. Results 
A. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Tables I, Panels A, B, and C present the descriptive statistics of the various independent and 
dependent variables that are specified in the core models of the study. The statistics refer to 
the winsorized financial variables that are used to remove significant outliers from the 
distributions of the risk and utility measures and the control variables. According to the 
statistics provided in Table I Panel A, the mean values for each of the individual component 
CSP measures are small, ranging between 0.0371 (Community concerns) and 0.1253 
(Product concerns).  The low mean values, combined with the zero median values of all 
measures, indicate that for the majority of firm–year observations, the most frequent score in 
each CSP dimension is zero (indicative of the absence of the respective strength or concern). 
It should also be noted that, by construction, each component can only take specific discrete 
values within the [0,1] range. For example, Community strengths can take a value of 0, 0.25, 
0.50, 0.75, or 1 depending on how many of the four respective indicators are present for a 
particular firm in a specific year according to KLD. Standard deviations of KLD scores are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
performed. The vast majority of them result in very high p-values (much above 0.10), 
indicating high levels of support for the null hypothesis of no correlation of the residuals. 
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also similar amongst individual components. It is worth noting that Community strengths has 
both the smallest mean and the smallest standard deviation (0.0970) while Product concerns 
has both the highest mean and the highest standard deviation (0.1999). Aggregating across 
CSP dimensions, one can see in Table I Panel B that the mean and median scores are very 
similar, a bit higher for strengths (mean of 0.0786) than for concerns (mean of 0.0743) but 
with the variability of concerns scores being higher than that of strengths (0.0926 against 
0.0775).  
 The average winsorized value of the logarithm of firm market value is 8.91.
19
 The 
average firm–year observation also has a MTBV ratio of 3.70, a dividend yield of 1.89% and 
a leverage ratio of 1.38. As for the dependent variables, one can notice in Table I Panel C that 
the average values of all beta measures are very close to unity, as they ought to be. They do 
not exactly equal one, for the simple reason that this is an unbalanced panel of data. Lastly, 
the mean utility measures are negative and algebraically lower as risk aversion increases, 
with the interpretation being that, on average, any positive utility effects coming from reaping 
positive returns are increasingly offset by the respective values of the volatility of returns.
20
   
 The first two panels of Table II provide some additional interesting statistics. Table II 
Panel A contains Pearson product-moment correlations between the various individual 
social/environmental components as well as the aggregate measures. By construction, 
aggregate strengths (concerns) are highly positively correlated to uni-dimensional strengths 
(concerns). What is interesting is the fact that, overall, there are small but positive 
correlations amongst social strengths and concerns, thus reinforcing the opinion that strengths 
and concerns are distinct constructs that should not be mixed in empirical research as they do 
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  Market value is reported in thousands of dollars. 
20 Assuming that the negative exponential utility function is appropriate.   
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not constitute the flip sides of the same coin. Also, the correlations between individual 
components are small in absolute value, so near multicollinearity issues are not expected to 
arise in the estimation of model (8). Furthermore, as was expected, there are high but not 
perfect positive correlations between the conventional risk metrics and their downside risk 
analogues (Table II Panel B). This indicates that they capture slightly different characteristics 
of market risk. Also intuitive is the fact that the utility measures are moderately negatively 
related to the risk metrics (which should be the case according to Equation (7)) and highly 
positively correlated for different levels of risk aversion. 
 Table II Panel C displays the mean values of the individual component measures for 
each super-sector, and shows cross-sector variation that is broadly consistent with expected 
tendencies for certain social/environmental issues to be more salient in some industries and 
less so in others. In particular, in industries where employees are subject to relatively 
intensive and hazardous workplaces and working practices (such as Automobiles, Basic 
Resources, Construction materials, Oil & Gas, Telecoms, Industrial goods) we observe high 
scores either in terms of KLD strengths or concerns or both. Environmental issues, on the 
other hand, have higher mean values in sectors for which pollution and other environmental 
impacts are relatively focal issues: Automobiles, Basic resources, Chemicals, Construction 
Materials, Utilities, Oil & Gas, and Industrial goods. The Product safety/quality and 
Community dimensions appear to be most prominent in those supersectors where it is 
beneficial for the firm to establish long-term relationships with customers built upon a 
corporate image and brand name that speaks of commitment, security and stability (such as 
Banking (Turnbull and Gibbs, 1987), Financial Services, Insurance, and Telecoms). 
 In this connection, it is also worth noting the tendency for relatively high mean values 
for both strengths and concerns to be found in a single sector at the same time. For example, 
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the Automobiles, Basic Resources, and Chemicals industries have scores that surpass the 
cross-industrial sample averages in both Environmental strengths and concerns. The same 
applies for the Telecoms, Travel & Leisure, and Automobiles supersectors regarding 
Diversity issues. The simultaneous prevalence among a given set of firms of strengths and 
concerns in a single dimension of CSP raises the possibility that firms commonly act from an 
imperative to reduce social harm that results from their business activities – motivated by a 
genuine sense of social responsibility or by a desire to ingratiate the firm with stakeholders 
that might otherwise view the firm as irresponsible and react accordingly. Moreover, the 
observation that CSP is not reflected in the presence of strengths or concerns but rather in a 
mixture of positive and negative indicators, ensures that a single, aggregate measure of CSP 
would overlook this considerable complexity. As we employ separate measures of strengths 
and concerns, we avoid this loss of information.  
B. Main results 
  The estimated values of the averaged fixed effects and slope coefficients of the 
“individual components model” are provided in Table III. Each column of Table III 
represents a different estimation of model (8) with the dependent variable (alternative risk or 
utility measure) listed at the top of each column.  Overall, there appears to be a negative but 
insignificant relationship between the various corporate social strengths and systematic 
financial risk. Not a single slope coefficient between any of the five strength components and 
any of the betas has a t-statistic with an absolute value greater than 1.6449 (the approximate 
critical value at the 10% level of significance for a two-tailed test). The results are very 
similar when certainty equivalents of stock returns are used as dependent variables, with the 
findings being largely insignificant, the exception being employment strengths which are 
negatively associated with investor utility for average and high levels of risk aversion. This 
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last finding could be rationalized by observing that some of the indicators of employment 
strengths have a financially ambiguous nature since they lead to immediate costs for the 
company with the expectation of medium- to long-term economic benefits. For example, 
significant cash profit sharing and strong retirement benefits are characteristically supportive 
of this line of reasoning (and both are used by KLD, as can be seen in Figure 1). Such 
practices are obviously costly for the firm but are expected to cause an easier attraction of 
superior quality employees, higher personnel retention ratios, decreased costs of staff training 
and improved employee loyalty. This result is also in contrast to the conclusions of Edmans 
(2011), who found a positive relationship between employee satisfaction and risk adjusted 
returns. However, Edmans (2011) uses the “100 Best Companies to Work for in America” as 
his CSP measure (which does not escape the criticism of halo effects) and risk adjusted 
returns as a performance metric which makes the results of the two studies somewhat 
incomparable.
 21
  
 When looking at the lower half of Table III, it is noticeable that the link between the 
individual concerns components and risk is stronger than the respective link between their 
strength counterparts and market risk. Community, Employment, and Environment concerns 
are all significantly positively related to systematic risk (slope coefficients of 0.1622, 0.1906, 
and 0.1680, respectively). Not only that, but these coefficients are much greater than most of 
the estimated coefficients between the array of risk metrics and social/environmental 
strengths. This observation provides strong support for Hypothesis 2, which stated that the 
effect of CSP concerns on financial risk would have a greater impact than that of CSP 
strengths and is in accordance with Lankoski’s (2009) findings that the economic impacts 
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 Meaning that it is possible that this type of measure captures financial success rather than 
CSP, to some extent, thus it is expected that the study will reveal a positive CSP-CFP link. 
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were more positive for CSP issues that reduce negative externalities (KLD concerns in this 
case) than for those that generate positive externalities (KLD strengths in this study). This 
weak negative (moderate positive) association between the individual KLD strength 
(concern) components and financial risk verify the findings of the Salama et al. (2009) study 
that focuses on a longitudinal data sample of firms from the UK. The results are also 
consistent with those of previous research with the same purpose but very different datasets 
and methodologies, such as Spicer (1978), Aupperle et al. (1985), McGuire et al. (1988), 
Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001). Focusing on utility measures, most of the results are 
statistically insignificant, but Employment concerns are significantly negatively associated 
with certainty equivalents, indicating that while implementing socially responsible practices 
towards employees may be excessively costly, being socially irresponsible in the same 
respect may lead to decreased levels of investor utility. 
 Moving on to Table IV, which presents the output of the estimation of model (9), 
there appears to be a statistically significant negative association between the aggregate 
measure of social strengths and firm beta (equal to –0.2938, significant at the 5% level) and a 
positive relationship between aggregate concerns and all risk metrics applied (slope of 0.3629 
for beta and 0.3760 for the Harlow and Rao downside beta, both significant at the 1% level). 
The fact that an array of risk metrics verifies the positive relationship between risk and 
aggregate CSP concerns, but the same does not happen for aggregate strengths further 
reinforces hypotheses 1b and 2. Also, since the statistically significant estimated slope 
coefficients are of either similar or greater absolute value than those of the individual 
component models, it appears that the effect of CSP on market risk is not necessarily better 
captured when disaggregated measures of social performance are used.  However, all the 
results of the “aggregate models” that use utility measures as dependent variables are 
statistically insignificant, a finding that enhances the idea that disaggregate data may prove to 
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be more useful in relevant research, as “various aspects may have differential impacts 
depending on the nature of the firm’s business”  (Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin, 2006, p. 
103). Overall, the financial risk impact of corporate social performance is not masked when 
the aggregate measures replace the individual components, so the rationale of Godfrey et al. 
(2009) that a multidimensional measure of social performance will likely conceal the wealth-
enhancing effects of disaggregated CSP aspects is not verified in this case.
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 In both models, the goodness of fit statistics are very similar for the same dependent 
variables. The adjusted R–squares of the models using risk measures range from 
approximately 27% (for the Bawa and Lindeberg beta) up to approximately 35% (for beta) 
and all compare favorably to the Salama et al. (2009) estimations of  R–squares equal to 
11.5% for the fixed effects regression and 24.3% for the random effects regression as well as 
to the McGuire et al. (1988) results that are characterized by R–squares of 13.1% for the total 
market risk model and 17.5% for the systematic risk model. The adjusted R–squares are 
smaller when utility measures are applied, as these models appear to explain, at a maximum, 
approximately 26% of the variability of investor utility (for a moderate level of absolute risk 
aversion equal to 5). 
 
C. Moderating effects of volatility conditions 
 During the development of the hypotheses that this study examines, it was stated that 
the overall volatility of the stock market may be an important moderating factor in the 
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 Tables III and IV do not include slopes for the R&D intensity or liquidity measures. These control variables 
are later added to test the robustness of the models. Many firms in the Datastream database have missing values 
for R&D. We set R&D expenditures equal to zero when the value is missing, following Benson, Davidson, 
Wang, and Worrell, (2011). In addition, because of the different capital structures between firms operating in 
sectors with fundamentally dissimilar characteristics, alternative measures of financial leverage are used in the 
specifications of the basic models. Specifically, the total debt to common equity ratio is interchanged with the 
total debt to total sales and total debt to total assets ratios. Overall, the signs, values and statistical significance 
of the estimated coefficients as well as the goodness of fit statistics are remarkably close to those of the original 
specifications. Results are not reported but are available from the authors. 
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relationship between CSP and financial risk. To test this assertion, the panel data sample was 
split into two smaller subsamples according to the average level of stock returns volatility for 
a yearly period. Figure 2 clearly shows that average annualized weekly volatility remains 
within a range between 24% and a little more than 37% for most years of the sample but 
spikes up to a range between 44% and approximately 56% for the periods 2000–2002, 
attributable to the burst of the “dot.com” bubble, and 2008–2009, when the downturn in the 
US real estate market lead to a global economic crisis. So firm–year observations from these 
two periods are stacked together and then structured appropriately in the same way that the 
original sample was.    
 Table V presents the estimation of Equation (8) for the “high volatility” sample. The 
statistically significant results are once more very similar to those produced by the core 
analysis of the initial sample, revealing a positive relationship between 
Employment/Environment concerns and financial risk. The slope coefficients between these 
concerns components and the various risk measures are often two times, or more, greater than 
those estimated when the entire longitudinal sample was used. For example, when beta is 
treated as the dependent variable, the slope coefficients estimated in the initial analysis are 
0.1906 for Employment concerns and 0.1680 for Environment concerns while the respective 
values for the “high volatility sample” are 0.3395 and 0.3174, respectively. No significant 
results are found when utility metrics are used as dependent variables and as such the relevant 
estimates are not reported. The results of the estimation of model (8) when the “low 
volatility” sample is used are provided in Table VI. The picture is now very different. It is the 
strengths components that produce more pronounced results, with Diversity and Employment 
being significantly negatively related to risk (across both conventional and downside risk 
measures), while concerns produce results that are less significant and more randomly 
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distributed across the various risk metrics models. Community and Environment concerns 
show some signs of significant positive association with the various betas. 
 When these results are jointly taken into account, it appears as if, especially in times 
of financial distress, social and environmental corporate concerns are priced by the market 
and lead to higher levels of stock price volatility for companies that ‘do wrong’, while in 
times of economic euphoria, or at least times of no significant general economic hazards, the 
importance of CSP strengths becomes more pronounced and is able to decrease the levels of a 
firm’s stock market risk. To put it differently, these results seem to provide evidence that the 
market encourages a “slack resources” type of firm behavior (Waddock and Graves, 1997) 
during good times as CSP strengths have stronger wealth-protective effects then. On the other 
hand, the market appears to concentrate more on CSP concerns during bad times, when it 
penalizes the companies that are being socially irresponsible more severely through higher 
financial risk. 
 It should also be noted that the adjusted R–squares of the estimated models for the 
high volatility periods are all considerably higher compared to those of the regressions of the 
original sample with a range between 40.9% and 50.6% when risk is used as a dependent 
variable. The fact that the usual winsorization process is applied to the dataset before the 
model estimations are made helps to ensure that this observation is not likely to be an artifact 
of the volatility outliers that are bound to exist in these circumstances. A more intuitive 
explanation is that the importance of CSP (and the set of control variables) as a determinant 
of market risk increases in times of economic turbulence. 
 It could be argued that because both market crises happened in the latter half our 
entire sample (2000 to 2002 for the dot-com bubble and 2008–2009 for the credit crisis), the 
results coming from the sample splits into high and low volatility periods might in fact reflect 
  
 
42 
a changing external environment with respect to societal expectations of firms. In order to 
examine this assertion we choose to split our sample in the middle of each time series 
dimension and create two subsamples: one from 1992 to 2000 and one from 2001 to 2009 
(the dates refer to the financial data, the CSP variables being lagged by a year). We then 
repeat our original analysis and compare the earlier period results with the ones coming from 
the low volatility sample and the later period results with those of the high volatility sample. 
Despite the fact that these pairs of samples have many firm–year observations in common 
they do not really lead to similar conclusions. The coefficient estimates coming from the 
1990s and 2000s subsamples are generally insignificant, small in size, and often take 
different signs from the ones estimated when the entire dataset is split according to the levels 
of overall volatility. So it appears that the inferences that are drawn based on the splitting of 
our panel into high and low volatility periods are not influenced by a changing external 
environment in regards to CSP.  
 The general issue of endogeneity becomes more topical when discussing the results of 
the analyses of the volatility subsamples. It has been stated that in order to account for the 
potential existence of a contemporaneous, bidirectional association between CSP and firm 
risk, we lagged the independent variables that are used in our models. However, in an attempt 
to address the possibility that there is a two–way lead–lag effect between the two variables of 
concern, we estimate alternative models in which systematic risk is the lagged independent 
variable and the various individual components of social strengths and concerns are the 
regressands. We do so for our entire panel dataset as well as for the high volatility and low 
volatility periods subsamples. The results of this robustness test strongly indicate that there is 
no economically significant evidence of a relationship running between systematic risk and 
subsequent CSP. The algebraic values of the estimated slope coefficients are particularly low 
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and their statistical significance lower (or at most comparable in size) with that of the results 
of the main analysis. The same applies when aggregate strengths and aggregate concerns are 
used as dependent variables. 
VI. Conclusions 
 This study investigates the relationship between corporate social performance and 
financial risk for an extensive panel data sample of US companies between the years 1992 
and 2009. In addition, the association between CSP and investor utility is examined.  The 
main finding is that most of the individual social strength components (Community, 
Diversity, Employment, Product safety and quality) are negatively but insignificantly 
associated with systematic firm risk while most of the individual social concern components 
(Community, Employment, Environment) are significantly positively related to measures of 
systematic risk. The fact that the use of both conventional and downside risk measures leads 
to the same conclusions adds convergent validity to the analysis. Utility measures lead to 
results of great variability and small statistical significance in accordance with the fact that 
there is no clear consensus in the literature that researches the “wealth-enhancing” effects of 
CSP. Even with the additional inclusion of higher moments (skewness and kurtosis), it 
appears that the risk/return trade-off is such that no clear utility gain or loss can be realized 
by investing in firms characterized by different levels of social and environmental 
performance. 
 The results of aggregate strength and concern measures are aligned with those of the 
individual components and their impacts on risk are actually more pronounced. Interesting 
conclusions are also drawn when we try to investigate how generalized conditions of market 
volatility moderate the CSP–risk relation. In comparison with the results of the main part of 
this study, it becomes more visible that, in times of small or moderate levels of volatility, 
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firms that engage in socially responsible behavior are characterized by lower levels of market 
risk, while during times of high volatility, firms that are socially irresponsible are associated 
with higher levels of financial risk.   
 By concentrating on an under-researched question, this study manages to uncover new 
pieces of the CSP–CFP puzzle. The finding that corporate social performance affects the 
ability of a company to cope with adverse systemic economic shocks should be considered by 
firm managers when they make strategic business decisions and private or institutional 
investors when they are trying to identify the optimal asset allocation of their wealth. The 
latter is especially true for those institutional investors (pension funds, life assurance 
companies) that have significantly predictable outflows to beneficiaries and want to invest in 
shares that are not very volatile. Future research may use this study as a starting point to 
examine the mediating and moderating effects of other factors in the CSP–risk relation, such 
as the interactions between social/environmental strengths and concerns and their potential 
impact on financial risk and returns, or concentrate on revealing the nature of the 
idiosyncratic elements of risk that are affected by socially/environmentally responsible and 
irresponsible behavior.  
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Figure 1. Omnipresent Indicators of Qualitative Issue Areas of 
Interest 
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Figure 2. Annualised Weekly Standard Deviation of Returns for Year by Year S&P 500 Samples, 1992-2009 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Table contains mean, median, maximum and minimum values and standard deviations for all variables of interest. Log(mv) is the logarithm of market 
capitalization, mtbv is market-to-book value, dy is dividend yield, tdce is the total debt to common equity ratio; HR Beta and BL Beta refer to the Harlow-
Rao and Bawa and Lindenberg betas; CE refers to certainty equivalents with absolute risk aversion (γ) in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables       
  Community 
Strengths 
Diversity 
Strengths 
Employment 
Strengths 
Environment 
Strengths 
Product 
Strengths 
Community 
Concerns 
Diversity 
Concerns 
Employment 
Concerns 
Environment 
Concerns 
Product 
Concerns 
 Mean 0.0755 0.1187 0.1040 0.0517 0.0433 0.0371 0.0563 0.0725 0.0809 0.1253 
 Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 1.0000 0.8571 0.8000 0.8000 0.7500 0.7500 1.0000 0.7500 1.0000 1.0000 
 Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Std. Dev. 0.1459 0.1585 0.1489 0.1078 0.1020 0.0970 0.1649 0.1387 0.1521 0.1999 
Observations 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
  Aggregate 
Strengths 
Aggregate 
Concerns 
LOG(MV) MTBV DY TDCE 
 Mean      0.0786 0.0743 8.91 3.70 1.89 1.38 
 Median 0.0571 0.0500 8.84 2.56 1.63 0.62 
 Maximum 0.5614 0.6833 12.16 24.05 7.44 20.97 
 Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 6.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 0.0775 0.0926 1.22 3.67 1.68 2.76 
 Observations 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 
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Panel C. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables  
  Beta HR Beta BL Beta CE (γ=2) CE (γ=5) CE (γ=20) 
Mean 1.016 1.024 1.031 -0.001 -0.006 -0.046 
Median 0.955 0.967 0.955 0.000 -0.002 -0.015 
Maximum 2.967 2.876 3.181 0.013 0.009 0.002 
Minimum -0.139 -0.187 -0.312 -0.038 -0.078 -0.899 
Std. Dev. 0.565 0.576 0.641 0.008 0.013 0.116 
Skewness 0.804 0.683 0.752 -1.786 -2.882 -5.611 
Sum 7094.29 7150.18 7204.33 -10.22 -41.64 -320.07 
Observations 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 6986 
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Table II. Correlation Coefficients Between Key Variables and CSP Values by Industry 
COMS and COMC are community strengths(s) and community concerns(c), respectively,  DIV is used for the diversity indicator, ENV for the environment 
indicator, EMP for the employment indicator, PSQ for the product safety and quality indicator; HR Beta and BL Beta refer to the Harlow-Rao and Bawa and 
Lindenberg betas; CE refers to certainty equivalents with absolute risk aversion (γ).  COMS and COMC are community strengths(s) and community 
concerns(c), respectively, DIV is used for the diversity indicator, ENV for the environment indicator, EMP for the employment indicator, PSQ for the product 
safety and quality indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A.  Pearson Product-moment Correlations  
 AGGS COMS DIVS EMPS ENVS PRODS AGGC COMC DIVC EMPC ENVC PRODC 
AGGS 1.000            
COMS 0.576 1.000           
DIVS 0.705 0.308 1.000          
EMPS 0.595 0.074 0.205 1.000         
ENVS 0.477 0.083 0.177 0.139 1.000        
PSQS 0.508 0.085 0.198 0.230 0.158 1.000       
AGGC 0.245 0.070 0.286 0.076 0.208 0.057 1.000      
COMC 0.155 0.035 0.154 0.101 0.123 0.021 0.523 1.000     
DIVC 0.164 0.098 0.221 0.038 0.028 0.053 0.609 0.160 1.000    
EMPC 0.096 -0.024 0.145 0.016 0.088 0.058 0.595 0.204 0.264 1.000   
ENVC 0.134 -0.039 0.047 0.103 0.305 0.017 0.588 0.306 0.086 0.229 1.000  
PSQC 0.190 0.109 0.270 0.006 0.105 0.026 0.701 0.220 0.260 0.194 0.223 1.000 
Panel B. Pearson Product-moment Correlations 
  Beta HR Beta BL Beta CE (γ=2)  CE (γ=5)  CE (γ=20) 
Beta 1.000      
HR Beta 0.943 1.000         
BL Beta 0.888 0.926 1.000    
CE (γ=2)  -0.185 -0.157 -0.225 1.000     
CE (γ=5)  -0.087 -0.078 -0.058 0.882 1.000  
  
 
55 
 
 
 
 
CE (γ=20) -0.071 -0.063 -0.037 0.858 0.999 1.000 
   Panel C. Mean Values of KLD Scores by Industry    
 Automobiles Banks Basic 
Resources 
Chemicals Construction 
Materials 
Finance Food & 
Beverage 
Healthcare Industrial 
Goods 
Insurance 
COMS 0.0426 0.2107 0.0581 0.0613 0.0315 0.1813 0.1057 0.0768 0.0368 0.0945 
DIVS 0.1534 0.1673 0.0316 0.0756 0.0204 0.1758 0.1742 0.1447 0.0690 0.1098 
EMPS 0.1911 0.1113 0.0157 0.0879 0.0857 0.0974 0.0859 0.0967 0.0898 0.0847 
ENVS 0.1052 0.0066 0.1107 0.1144 0.0588 0.0029 0.0446 0.0507 0.0650 0.0046 
PSQS 0.0500 0.0282 0.0258 0.0632 0.0063 0.0742 0.0148 0.0564 0.0637 0.0106 
COMC 0.0500 0.0813 0.0526 0.0302 0.0231 0.0385 0.0336 0.0163 0.0409 0.0122 
DIVC 0.1407 0.0579 0.0332 0.0253 0.0252 0.0989 0.0607 0.0359 0.0635 0.1026 
EMPC 0.1296 0.0310 0.1301 0.0788 0.0819 0.0266 0.0852 0.0290 0.0897 0.0285 
ENVC 0.1988 0.0000 0.2724 0.2685 0.1653 0.0006 0.0951 0.0621 0.1119 0.0049 
PSQC 0.1630 0.1226 0.0470 0.1265 0.1597 0.2115 0.1336 0.2823 0.1082 0.1604 
Observations 185 363 271 257 119 273 305 612 1040 307 
       Panel C. Mean Values of KLD Scores by Industry (Continued)  
 Media Oil & 
Gas 
Personal &  
Household 
Goods 
Real 
Estate 
Retail Technology Telecoms Travel & 
Leisure 
Utilities 
COMS 0.0661 0.0303 0.1173 0.0069 0.0742 0.0366 0.1205 0.0303 0.0756 
DIVS 0.1518 0.0402 0.1393 0.0298 0.1188 0.1581 0.2282 0.1817 0.0996 
EMPS 0.0233 0.1403 0.0889 0.0167 0.0739 0.1842 0.0993 0.1225 0.0494 
ENVS 0.0314 0.0806 0.0457 0.0028 0.0182 0.0478 0.0029 0.0382 0.1155 
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PSQS 0.0886 0.0148 0.0290 0.0000 0.0337 0.0684 0.0360 0.0361 0.0104 
COMC 0.0123 0.1310 0.0290 0.0000 0.0160 0.0180 0.0468 0.0116 0.0652 
DIVC 0.0291 0.0507 0.0264 0.0208 0.1290 0.0132 0.1511 0.1214 0.0312 
EMPC 0.0852 0.1289 0.0492 0.0347 0.1079 0.0645 0.1025 0.0809 0.0687 
ENVC 0.0082 0.2089 0.0401 0.0231 0.0098 0.0166 0.0228 0.0154 0.1674 
PSQC 0.0628 0.0944 0.1011 0.0486 0.1155 0.0522 0.2194 0.0780 0.1403 
Observations 223 355 569 72 593 833 139 173 433 
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Table III. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Individual Components Model 
Cell entries are parameter estimates; each column corresponds to the output of a different fixed effects regression; all dependent variables have been winsorized at 
the 1% level; α is the average of the firm-specific fixed effects; βcoms and βcomc are the slope coefficients for the community strengths(s) and community 
concerns(c) indicators, respectively,  div is used for the diversity indicator, env for the environment indicator, emp for the employment indicator, psq for the 
product indicator, log(mv) is the logarithm of market capitalization, mtbv is market-to-book value, dy is dividend yield ,  tdce is the total debt to common equity 
ratio; HR Beta and BL Beta refer to the Harlow-Rao and Bawa and Lindenberg betas; CE refers to certainty equivalents with absolute risk aversion (γ) in 
parenthesis; entries of the last row are adjusted R
2 
values for each regression. t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 Beta HR Beta BL Beta CE (γ=2)  CE (γ=5)  CE (γ=20) 
α 1.1901*** 1.4963*** 0.8264*** 0.0429*** 0.0537*** 0.2270*** 
 (10.7609) (12.9393) (6.2061) (24.0130) (19.0429) (8.8585) 
βcoms -0.0429 -0.0569 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0012 0.0168 
 (-0.6916) (-0.8777) (-0.0190) (-0.0850) (0.7654) (1.1727) 
βdivs -0.0873 -0.0538 -0.0714 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0181 
 (-1.3359) (-0.7872) (-0.9071) (1.0405) (0.0589) (-1.1928) 
βemps -0.0860 -0.0837 -0.0892 -0.0008 -0.0035** -0.0485*** 
 (-1.4044) (-1.3080) (-1.2097) (-0.8234) (-2.2584) (-3.4214) 
βenvs 0.0272 0.0342 0.1095 -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0084 
 (0.3482) (0.4194) (1.1653) (-1.0733) (-0.6536) (0.4648) 
βpsqs -0.1452 -0.1164 -0.0931 0.0001 0.0003 0.0187 
 (-1.4742) (-1.1295) (-0.7851) (0.0495) (0.1246) (0.8184) 
βcomc 0.1622** 0.1755** 0.1327 -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0023 
 (2.0722) (2.1448) (1.4076) (-0.2088) (-0.5465) (0.1259) 
βdivc 0.0342 0.0303 0.0104 0.0001 0.0004 0.0045 
 (0.7397) (0.6264) (0.1872) (0.0853) (0.3266) (0.4163) 
βempc 0.1906*** 0.1271** 0.1307* -0.0010 -0.0035** -0.0312** 
 (3.415) (2.1781) (1.9447) (-1.1319) (-2.4826) (-2.4150) 
βenvc 0.1680** 0.2416*** 0.1046 0.0037*** 0.0055*** 0.0366* 
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 (2.036) (2.8007) (1.0534) (2.7883) (2.6029) (1.9142) 
βpsqc -0.0456 -0.0181 -0.0848 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0156 
 (-0.9652) (-0.3675) (-1.4919) (0.5923) (0.0054) (-1.4303) 
βlog(mv) -0.0275** -0.0623*** 0.0146 -0.0048*** -0.0061*** -0.0247*** 
 (-2.2117) (-4.7953) (0.9728) (-23.8808) (-19.2004) (-8.5736) 
βmtbv 3.6967 3.9516 7.3366** -0.3689*** -0.6776*** -2.3554*** 
 (1.2928) (1.3216) (2.131) (-7.9944) (-9.2982) (-3.5554) 
βdy 0.0176** 0.0196*** 0.0224*** -0.0004*** -0.0015*** -0.0182*** 
 (2.526) (2.6879) (2.6732) (-3.1156) (-8.4567) (-11.2653) 
βtdce 0.0154*** 0.0135*** 0.0068 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0031*** 
 (3.2949) (2.7474) (1.2093) (0.9871) (0.0459) (-2.8625) 
Adj.R
2
 0.3504 0.3162 0.2684 0.2179 0.2577 0.1750 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table IV. Fixed Effects Regressions of the Aggregated Components Model 
Cell entries are parameter estimates; each column corresponds to the output of a different fixed effects regression; all dependent variables have been winsorized at 
the 1% level; α is the average of the firm specific fixed effects; βaggs and βaggc are the slope coefficients for the aggregate  strengths(s) and aggregate concerns(c) 
indicators, respectively, log(mv) is the logarithm of market capitalization, mtbv is market-to-book value, dy is dividend yield, and tdce is the total debt to common 
equity ratio; entries of last row are adjusted R
2
 values for each regression..  t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 Beta HR Beta BL Beta CE (γ=2) CE (γ=5) CE (γ=20) 
α 1.1981*** 1.4931*** 0.8426*** 0.0427*** 0.0542*** 0.2395*** 
 (11.0700) (13.1966) (6.4681) (24.4356) (19.6473) (9.5460) 
βaggs -0.2938** -0.2402 -0.1319 -0.0008 -0.0038 -0.0439 
 (-2.0145) (-1.5757) (-0.7518) (-0.3588) (-1.0263) (-1.2993) 
βaggc 0.3629*** 0.3760*** 0.1589 0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0392 
 (3.4165) (3.3857) (1.2426) (0.7777) (-0.6581) (-1.5922) 
βlog(mv) -0.0288** -0.0618*** 0.0120 -0.0047*** -0.0061*** -0.0260*** 
 (-2.3737) (-4.8684) (0.8226) (-24.2233) (-19.7399) (-9.2350) 
βmtbv 3.6470 3.7993 7.2500** -0.3705*** -0.6795*** -2.3489*** 
 (1.2795) (1.2751) (2.1134) (-8.0595) (-9.3534) (-3.5551) 
βdy 0.0188*** 0.0206*** 0.0234*** -0.0004*** -0.0015*** -0.0183*** 
 (2.7122) (2.8294) (2.8029) (-3.1331) (-8.5150) (-11.3474) 
βtdce 0.0153*** 0.0134*** 0.0068 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0032*** 
 (3.2789) (2.7542) (1.2115) (0.9570) (0.0157) (-2.9292) 
Adj.R
2
 0.3495 0.3157 0.2680 0.2176 0.2567 0.1731 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table V. The Effects of CSP on Risk During Periods of High Quality Volatility 
Cell entries are parameter estimates; t-statistics in parentheses; each column corresponds to the output of a different fixed effects regression 
using data from the periods 2000 to 2002 and 2008 to 2009; all dependent variables have been winsorized at the 1% level; α is the average of the 
firm specific fixed effects; βcoms and βcomc are the slope coefficients for the community strengths(s) and community concerns(c) indicators 
respectively,  div is used for the diversity indicator, env for the environment indicator, emp for the employment indicator, psq for the product 
indicator, log(mv) is the logarithm of market capitalisation, mtbv is market-to-book value, dy is dividend yield ,  tdce is the total debt to common 
equity ratio; HR Beta and BL Beta refer to the Harlow-Row and Bawa and Lindenberg betas; entries of last row are adjusted R
2 
values for each 
regression. 
 
 Beta HR Beta BL Beta 
α -0.2735 0.2446 -0.6215** 
 (-0.9501) (0.8126) (-2.0387) 
βcoms -0.1462 -0.2265 -0.2393 
 (-0.8146) (-1.2018) (-1.2465) 
βdivs 0.3778*** 0.2845* 0.2485 
 (2.6900) (1.8594) (1.5645) 
βemps 0.0666 0.1428 0.1244 
 (0.4727) (0.9560) (0.7959) 
βenvs -0.0092 -0.0104 -0.0205 
 (-0.0591) (-0.0612) (-0.1201) 
βpsqs 0.2295 0.1050 0.0933 
 (1.0938) (0.4674) (0.3936) 
βcomc -0.0766 -0.0506 -0.0473 
 (-0.4904) (-0.2960) (-0.2734) 
βdivc 0.0836 0.0709 0.0799 
 (0.8396) (0.6569) (0.7268) 
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βempc 0.3395*** 0.2352** 0.2488** 
 (3.0710) (1.9987) (2.1067) 
βenvc 0.3174* 0.4966*** 0.4767** 
 (1.9409) (2.7003) (2.5446) 
βpsqc 0.1644 0.1223 0.1826 
 (1.604) (1.0931) (1.5801) 
βlog(mv) 0.0971*** 0.0441 0.1319*** 
 (3.1186) (1.3606) (4.0148) 
βmtbv 19.3738*** 17.8449*** 18.5876*** 
 (3.7557) (3.2407) (3.2838) 
βdy 0.0967*** 0.0929*** 0.1108*** 
 (6.6284) (6.0011) (6.9493) 
βtdce 0.0165 0.0195* 0.0201* 
 (1.4878) (1.6681) (1.7418) 
Adj.R
2
 0.5056 0.4481 0.4496 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table VI. The Effects of CSP on Risk During Periods of Low Volatility  
 
Cell entries are parameter estimates; t-statistics in parentheses; each column corresponds to the output of a different fixed effects regression 
using data from the periods 1992 to 1999 and 2003 to 2007; all dependent variables have been winsorized at the 1% level; α is the average of the 
firm specific fixed effects; βcoms and βcomc are the slope coefficients for the community strengths(s) and community concerns(c) indicators 
respectively,  div is used for the diversity indicator, env for the environment indicator, emp for the employment indicator, psq for the product 
indicator, log(mv) is the logarithm of market capitalisation, mtbv is market-to-book value, dy is dividend yield ,  tdce is the total debt to common 
equity ratio; HR Beta and BL Beta refer to the Harlow-Row and Bawa and Lindenberg betas; entries of last row are adjusted R
2
 values for each 
regression 
 
 
 Beta HR Beta BL Beta 
α 1.5515*** 1.8693*** 1.0936*** 
 (10.8895) (12.4621) (6.1438) 
βcoms -0.0258 -0.0385 0.0415 
 (-0.3853) (-0.5436) (0.4643) 
βdivs -0.2336*** -0.1777** -0.2098** 
 (-3.0756) (-2.2188) (-2.1373) 
βemps -0.1664** -0.2017** -0.1758* 
 (-2.1985) (-2.5021) (-1.8429) 
βenvs 0.1065 0.1203 0.1650 
 (1.1928) (1.2912) (1.4483) 
βpsqs -0.2909** -0.2041 -0.1378 
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 (-2.2748) (-1.5941) (-0.8734) 
βcomc 0.2305** 0.2293** 0.1442 
 (2.3058) (2.1221) (1.1681) 
βdivc -0.0055 -0.0087 -0.0388 
 (-0.0997) (-0.1533) (-0.5787) 
βempc 0.1099 0.084 0.1345 
 (1.437) (1.0342) (1.4193) 
βenvc 0.1770* 0.2215** 0.0722 
 (1.7407) (2.0558) (0.5938) 
βpsqc -0.0830 -0.0286 -0.1290* 
 (-1.4914) (-0.4904) (-1.8487) 
βlog(mv) -0.0496*** -0.0884*** 0.0022 
 (-3.073) (-5.1971) (0.1081) 
βmtbv -0.7391 -1.1290 6.5707 
 (-0.2087) (-0.3048) (1.444) 
βdy -0.0482*** -0.0383*** -0.0396*** 
 (-4.9058) (-3.7061) (-3.2095) 
βtdce 0.0125* 0.0116* 0.0044 
 (1.9415) (1.7824) (0.5382) 
Adj.R
2
 0.3163 0.2779 0.2244 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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